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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
The study provides an overview of the bail-in not only as a resolution tool per se, 
but more so as a shift of perspective of who must bear the costs and responsibility of 
reviving an ailing institution, especially in the EU, under the harmonized set of rules of 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The Resolution framework has 
entered into force on 1 January 2015, while the respective bail-in procedures are 
applicable for all member states since 1 January 2016. Bearing in mind the respective 
arguments deriving from scholars and leading industry delegates, this work aims at 
assessing the rationale of the bail-in tool and the goals it seeks to achieve under the 
relevant regime. In particular an evaluation from a legal and socioeconomic point of 
view will be undertaken to determine whether the departure from the recent practice of 
public bail-outs can be an effective strategy to satisfy public policy considerations of 
utmost importance; namely to preserve and restore the financial institutions’ critical 
economic functions at the expense of the associated fundamental property rights of its 
stakeholders; Its creditors and shareholders.  
In another chapter of the study, bail-in is examined in the context of burden 
sharing and by reviewing recent live cases it highlights the controversial decisions of 
the authorities regarding the provision of state aid to distressed banks. To that end, 
special attention is given to the interconnectedness and friction of the Resolution 
framework with the State aid framework whereby authorities of the relevant member 
states manipulated in many instances the respective frameworks merely to 
accommodate political pursuits. The systemic exception of precautionary 
recapitalizations is also examined in that context. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: bail-in; EU Resolution framework; public interest; State aid; precautionary 
recapitalizations.  
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Preface 
The financial crisis of 2008 – 2009 led to a vicious cycle of sovereign 
indebtedness and financial system destabilization. Such grim economic circumstances 
were mainly caused by governments adopting extensive bail-out schemes of banks at 
the expense of taxpayers. This practice also unveiled the vulnerability of the banking 
sector with respect to the loss of confidence from its depositors, creditors and other 
counterparties. A special arrangement designed for failing banks needed to be in place, 
-a comprehensive resolution regime- that provided the administrative authorities 
exclusive powers and tools to prevent systemic risks stemming from a bank’s failure, 
while maintaining recourse to the taxpayers’ purse to a minimum. 
In the EU the resolution regime applicable is the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive of 2014. One of its tools that drew my attention the most and motivated me 
to write this thesis is bail-in. It is the one that entails the most complexity in terms of 
its application due to the political, technical and economic challenges it presents 
especially under the detail-oriented BRRD framework.  
During my research on the current subject matter I was partly inspired by the 
well-regarded and much cited study of the two decorated professors Emilios Avgouleas 
and Charles Goodhart under the title “Critical reflections on bank bail-ins”. I tried to 
expand and reinforce the skepticism surrounding bank bail-ins further by elaborating 
on cases where the resolution authorities in select Member States were faced with 
serious dilemmas regarding the outcome of their respective ailing financial institutions; 
Namely, their continued support with the provision of taxpayers’ (State) aid, or the 
placement of the latter under resolution and the subsequent imposition of large losses 
on their stakeholders. Furthermore, I tried to present a detailed overview of the recent 
developments and proposals with respect i.e. to the MREL requirements as envisaged 
by the resolution authorities, and highlighted the difficulties that many medium-sized 
institutions in the EU will face in adhering to such stringent and burdensome 
prerequisites in the liabilities side of their balance sheet. 
Conclusively, it would be ungrateful of me if I failed to mention the people that 
contributed to this work. The following willingly or unwillingly influenced me and 
provided their material aid in order for me to complete this highly demanding research 
in the area of banking law. First of all I would like to thank Dr. Apostolos Gkoutzinis 
who taught the course of International Regulation of the Banking Sector in the 
previous academic year, as the title selection and initial motivation, though 
inadvertently, is attributed to his teachings. Moreover I would like to express my 
immense gratitude to my thesis supervisor Dr. Nikoletta Kleftouri for her invaluable 
support and guidance throughout the process, the lack of which would have made the 
conclusion of this study impossible. Lastly, I would like to thank my two best friends 
A.K. and V.C. for their unwavering encouragement and emotional support throughout 
the past few months of researching and writing.  
 
 
All errors remain my own. 
Vasilis Lisgaras 
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1. Introduction 
Bank Resolution is a huge topic these days. Resolution is a term of art, partly 
differentiated from the associated insolvency process which regulators seem to dislike 
especially with respect to large and complex financial institutes often referred to as Global 
and Systemic Financial Institutions, (G-SIFIs). These institutions have nowadays global 
reach and are structured primarily in the form of financial conglomerates with an 
appreciable degree of interconnectedness, complexity and impact on the global financial 
system.1 During the recent financial crisis a large number of failing banks were bailed out 
by governments using public funds because they were considered too big to fail, (TBTF). 
The level of state aid to these banks was unprecedented; this led to trillions of taxpayer's 
money being used for the sake of rescuing large financial institutions. The high profile 
cases of bank failures in the international stage, (Lehman Brothers, Fortis, Icelandic banks, 
Anglo Irish Bank and Dexia),2 revealed the urgent need for a robust legal framework to 
tackle these issues by ensuring the continuity of the critical economic functions of these 
systemic financial institutions to the real economy and containing the widespread spill-over 
effect to the financial system; At the same time the previously condemned practice of bail-
outs had to end. Bail-outs were deemed to undermine market discipline and be sources of 
moral hazard, whilst also create a doom loop between bank debt and sovereign debt, 
thereby seriously impairing public finances. The examples of UK and Irish finances serve 
as illustrative examples of sovereign indebtedness 3 thereto. 
The initial legislative proposal was finally put into effect by replacing the previous 
practice of rescuing, (bailing-out) failing banks to that of bail-in; with the new framework up 
and running systemically important financial institutions from now on are put into resolution 
and are allowed to fail in an orderly way. By doing so, the regulators adhere to their urge of 
safeguarding the resolution objectives, whilst dismantling the associated moral hazard. 
This new approach is based on the penalty principle, namely a shift of focus to the 
shareholders and creditors of an institution that ultimately ought to pay the costs of a 
failure. The previous notions of public subsidy are replaced by the aforementioned private 
 
1 Joseph H Sommer, 'Why bail-in? And How!' (December 2014), 20 Econ Pol Rev Volume 2, (Special Issue: Large and Complex Banks) 
207. 
2 Nikoletta Kleftouri, 'Deposit protection and Bank resolution' (first edition 25 August 2015, Oxford University Press), p 165. 
3 Emilios Avgouleas, Charles Goodhart, 'Critical reflections on bank bail-ins' (1 March 2015), JFR Volume 1, Issue 1 3, 4. 
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penalty4 or private insurance5 which in turn force banks to better monitor the costs of risks 
that they assume. Thus, by turning unsecured debt into equity regulators incentivize 
creditors whose claims would potentially be subject to a haircut, be more alert regarding 
the level of leverage a bank carries.6 Such monitoring would substantially reduce the scale 
of losses a bank might suffer in the event of failure; notably, the creditors would force the 
bank to behave more cautiously, since the new regime includes mechanisms like early 
intervention and closure rather than bail-out.7 
To that end a core principle of a healthy and competitive financial system is allowing 
an institution to fail in an orderly way – that is without an excessive disruption to the 
financial system and/or banking services and FMIs that accord critical services to society; 
e.g by extending credit to households and businesses, by providing guarantees, by 
providing clearing and settlement services of payment obligations etc. A level playing field 
was needed to address these issues whilst not exposing the tax payer's purse to 
unnecessary losses. 8  These notions were first highlighted by the Financial Stability 
Board's9  International standards for effective resolution regimes, (The Key Attributes), 
agreed by the G20 leaders in 2011.10 Under the Key attributes every jurisdiction shall 
provide for a designated administrative authority, (resolution authority), granted with 
exclusive powers to place into resolution any financial institution deemed to be 
systemically significant or critical if it fails, and also a resolution regime consistent with the 
attributes set out in this document. 11  The twelve Key Attributes remain the umbrella 
standard for resolution regimes, covering financial institutions of all types that could be 
systemic in failure. More specifically authorities are authorized to carry out bail-in, (and 
other resolution powers), on some Global Systemically important Banks (G-SIBS), based 
on firm-specific resolution strategies and plans that involve:  
 
4 Thomas F Huertas, 'The Case for Bail-ins' (in A Dombret and PS Kenadjian (ed) De Gruyter 2013), The Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive. 
5 See, in general, KPMG, ‘Bail-in Liabilities: Replacing Public Subsidy with Private Insurance’ (July 2012), available at: 
<https://docplayer.net/15205867-Bail-in-liabilities-replacing-public-subsidy-with-private-insurance.html>; Jeffrey N Gordon and Wolf-
Georg Ringe, ‘Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take’ (August 2014), 
Oxford Legal Research Paper Series 18/2014, available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361347> accessed 10 
January 2019. 
6 John C Coffee, ‘Systemic Risk after Dodd–Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Strategies Beyond Oversight’ (2011) 111 
Columb L Rev 795.  
7 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 5. 
8 Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England's approach to resolution’ (October 2017), para 1.4 p 11. 
9 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is established to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial authorities and 
international standard-setting bodies in order to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other 
financial sector policies. Its mandate is set out in the FSB Charter, which governs the policy-making and related activities of the FSB. 
These activities, including any decisions reached in their context, shall not be binding or give rise to any legal rights or obligations under 
the FSB’s Articles of Association.  
10 See FSB, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’, (November 2011), updated in October 2014, 
available at: <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf> ,  accessed 4 November 2018  
11 Ibid, p 5. 
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  writing down of equity or any other instrument that represents ownership in the 
firm, unsecured or uninsured claims of creditors to the extent necessary to absorb losses, 
all those in a manner that respects the creditors hierarchy of claims during normal 
insolvency proceedings; 
 
 converting into equity or other instruments of ownership of the firm under resolution 
(or its successor under the same jurisdiction), all or some of the creditors' unsecured or 
uninsured claims subject to the creditors' hierarchy of claims in liquidation; and 
 
 within the resolution process converting into equity or writing down any eligible 
convertible or contractual bail-in liabilities that have not been triggered before the initiation 
of the resolution proceedings and treat them in the same manner as instruments under a) 
or b).12 
In a nutshell, resolution and bail-in as one of its key mechanisms represents to some 
extent a pre-planned contract replacing insolvency and bankruptcy process, and thus 
giving greater certainty13 as regards the sufficiency of eligible capital and debt instruments 
to cover losses and enable rapid and non-disruptive recapitalization. Further, the bail-in 
tool can be used to keep the bank as going-concern and avoid the destructive effects of 
liquidation to the assets of a distressed financial institution.14 
Nevertheless, resolution and in particular bail-in as a fundamental shift in treatment 
and accountability of who must bear the losses in case of bank failures, was not met with 
uniform implementation across jurisdictions. In the USA for example the process through 
which bail-in and the subsequent conversion of creditors' rights takes place is justified only 
with respect to systemically important institutions, (SIFIs), and is embedded in the 
resolution mechanics and architecture that applies to such institutions, the so-called 
Orderly Liquidation Authority, (OLA).15 Notably, bail-in under Title II Dodd – Frank Act 
(DFA) is seen as a means of providing sufficient capital following the liquidation of the 
resolved holding company of a large financial group to its subsidiaries, for which the 
holding company acted as parent.16 
 
12 The Financial Stability Board (FSB), Consultative Document: 'Principles on Bail-in Execution' (30 November 2017), available at: 
<http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P301117-1.pdf> accessed 4 November 2018, 1. 
13 Ibid at n 6 (Coffee) 797, 806. 
14 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 5. 
15 Title II of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Act (Pub L 111–203, HR 4173, in the 
following: “Dodd-Frank Act” or “DFA”)).  
16 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 5. 
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In the European Union however, the vicious cycle between bank crises and 
sovereign indebtedness led regulators and Euro-zone governments to a breaking point. 
The internationally condemned practice of bail-outs needed to be wiped out not only due to 
the traditional conceptual denouncement of the moral hazard, but also due to the fact that 
the impact of bail-outs to fiscal indebtedness in most EU countries was immense. For 
these purposes the European Banking Union (EBU) was created alongside the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM),17 to promote prudential regulation, supervision and effective 
resolution of financial institutions when necessary. Both the EU Resolution regime, based 
on the EU Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) 18  and the ESM statute19 
require the prior participation of the bank's shareholders and creditors in dealing with the 
costs of bank resolution. This prior participation of the bank's stakeholders to its 
stabilization is mainly expressed through the bail-in tool, notwithstanding the utilization of 
other resolution tools. In the EU however there is a bifurcation when applying the bail-in 
tool. The firm is either remaining a going-concern and the bail-in tool is applied to effect 
recapitalization of the bank to restore its health, (open-bank bail-in process), or in 
conjunction with other resolution powers is treated as a gone concern, (closed-bank bail-in 
process). Essentially a closed-bank bail-in entails the recapitalization of a successor entity 
to which critical balance sheet elements of the failed firm have been transferred. 20 This 
approach is significantly different to the DFA's practice of SIFIs resolution, where only the 
second approach is followed. Such bifurcation seems to create uncertainties and 
problems.21  
This study consists of three main chapters. Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview 
of the EU resolution regime and recent developments; Chapter 3 examines bail-in in the 
context of burden-sharing and the interplay of the resolution regime with the Commission's 
state aid framework; finally, chapter 4 mainly highlights and assesses the deficiencies and 
applicability of the bail-in as a resolution tool stricto sensu in the BRRD. The last segment 
of this paper is dedicated to conclusions. 
 
17 Intergovernmental Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism of 2 Feburary 2012, T/ESM 2012-LT/en 2, available at:  
<https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20150203_-_esm_treaty_-_en.pdf>. 
18 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of 
credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and regs (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, 
[2014] OJ L 2014 173/190 (BRRD).  
19 See also ‘European Stability Mechanism ‘By-Laws’ (8 December 2014). 
20 BRRD, Art 43; Ibid at n 2 (Kleftouri), p 172  para 8.34. 
21 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 6. 
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2. Resolution under BRRD & bail-in mechanics 
In the EU the lack of a harmonized regime to ensure uniform insolvency laws 
throughout the European Union with the exception of the Directive on the Reorganization 
and Winding-up of Credit Institutions 22 adopted in 2001, (which mostly regulated conflict of 
laws issues and mutual recognition rather than substantive rules for bank insolvency laws 
across the EU), led to the adoption of a comprehensive legal framework to deal with 
financial institutions in distress; the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).23 
This EU-wide set of rules for bank recovery and resolution regulate and prevent bank 
crises and ensure the orderly resolution of failing banks with a view to minimizing the 
adverse effects that such an event might have on the real economy and public finances. 24 
In a nutshell the bank recovery and resolution rules provide national authorities with 
exclusive powers to effectively deal with national and cross-border institutions that are 
failing or likely to fail; They can also ascertain that the negative impact of bank failures to 
taxpayers remain to a minimum, (by establishing bail-in rules), and provide for the 
operation and contribution of resolution funds, financed by the industry, to cover the 
funding costs of failing banks if needed. 25  The new rules as clearly stated by the 
Commission are not intended to replace member state bank insolvency laws, but rather to 
provide minimum resolution tools and powers to national authorities, leaving each member 
state with discretion to decide upon enacting stricter rules which better fit their own 
economic circumstances and domestic legal frameworks, provided that they are aligned to 
the principles and objectives set out in the Directive.26 The member states were required to 
transpose the Directive in their domestic legislation by 31 December 2014 and to apply 
them from 1 January 2015. They were given an additional deadline to adopt the 
application of bail-in measures until 1 January 2016.27 
Mainly this set of rules empowers national authorities to act promptly, to prevent and 
deal with bank crises by regulating four key elements: I) preparation and 
 
22 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganization and winding up of credit 
institutions [2001] OJ L 125.  
23 Ibid at n 18 (BRRD). 
24 European Commission, Communication from the commission to the European parliament and the council: ‘A Roadmap towards a 
Banking Union’ (12 September 2012), COM/2012/0510 final, available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0510&from=en>, accessed 8 November 2018, p 5. 
25 European Council - Council of the European Union, 'Bank Recovery and Resolution', available at:  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-union/single-rulebook/bank-recovery-resolution/>, accessed 8 November 2018. 
26 European Commission, 'EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD): Frequently asked questions', Press Release (15 April 
2014), available at: < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-297_en.htm>, accessed 8 November 2018. 
27 BRRD, Art 130 (1). 
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presentation,(recovery and resolution planning),28 II) early intervention - when the banks 
are seriously stressed or in breach of capital requirements,29 III) application of resolution 
tools and powers at the point of non viability when the firm enters resolution, and IV) finally 
cooperation and coordination between national authorities in the event of a cross-border 
resolution of a financial group.30 The BRRD requires member states to assign one or 
exceptionally more national resolution authorities the task of applying the resolution tools 
and powers. The resolution authority may be a central bank, a ministry of finance, or any 
other public administrative authorities.31 
2.1 Objectives, conditions and general principles 
With the advent of the European Banking Union (EBU), the ECB retained its central 
role as the monetary policy planning institution, whilst was also conferred exclusive tasks 
as the centralized supervisory and resolution authority in the Euro-zone area via the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The SRM is the 
second pillar of the Banking Union alongside the SSM. Under the SRM the pivotal role of 
the centralized institution responsible for resolution is since January 2016 entrusted to the 
Single Resolution Board (SRB), which derives its powers from the BRRD and the SRM 
regulation 32 respectively. The SRB as the pan-European resolution authority for significant 
banks and other cross-border groups, works in close cooperation with national resolution 
authorities (NRAs) and its core mission is to ensure the orderly resolution of failing banks 
with a minimum impact on the real economy and public finances of the participating 
member states of the Banking Union.33  
In essence resolution is a restructuring of a bank by the resolution authority to meet 
the resolution objectives which are deemed of paramount importance to the general public 
interest. The resolution objectives are of equal importance and are: 34 a) the continuity of 
critical economic functions; b) the avoidance of a spill-over effect on the financial system, 
in particular by preventing contagion including to market infrastructures, and by 
maintaining market discipline, c) the protection of public funds by minimizing reliance on 
 
28 BRRD, Art 5; BRRD, Art 10. 
29 BRRD, Art 27. 
30 BRRD, Art 88. 
31 BRRD, Art 3 (3). 
32 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a 
uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [30.7.2014] OJ L 22.  
33 Single Resolution Board, ‘Resolution framework: Resolution Q&A’, available at: <https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/resolution-qa>, 
accessed 9 November 2018.  
34 BRRD, Art 31 (2). 
   
7 
 
extraordinary public financial support; d) the protection of insured depositors and insured 
investors; and e) the protection of client funds and client assets. These objectives are in 
the view of the regulator better safeguarded than under normal insolvency proceedings, 
where unnecessary destruction of value and ring-fencing of assets often takes place. 
In order for the resolution proceedings to initiate, the BRRD mandates that certain 
conditions be met. Notably, the relevant resolution authorities in consultation with the 
supervisory authorities must satisfy themselves that: i) the bank is failing or likely to fail 
(FOLTF) 35; ii) there are no alternative supervisory or private sector measures, (such as 
the recovery plan drawn by the firm 36), to prevent the failure and restore the firm to health 
within a reasonable time frame 37; and iii) resolution action is in the public interest, namely 
the resolution objectives would not be met to the same extent had the institution been 
wound up under normal insolvency proceedings; The so-called public interest threshold. 38 
With regard to the third condition the relevant authorities must undertake a deep analysis 
to determine the necessity and proportionality of the resolution action to achieve one or 
more of the resolution objectives which could have not been achieved in a satisfactory 
manner if the path of ordinary insolvency and liquidation procedure was followed. 39 
Notwithstanding the conditions to trigger resolution and the assessment by the 
authorities that the situation of the bank has seriously deteriorated to the point of non 
viability (PONV), the resolution authorities must honor the general principles of resolution 
40: 1) that the shareholders of the institution under resolution must bear losses first; 2) that 
creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner (pari passu treatment); 3) 
that no creditor shall incur greater losses than they would have incurred had the bank 
been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings (No creditor worse off principle); 4) 
that creditors of the institution shall bear losses after the shareholders, in accordance with 
the priority of their claims unless expressly provided otherwise in the BRRD; 5) that the 
management and senior management of the institution shall be replaced, unless keeping 
them in office is essential to achieve the resolution objectives; 6) that the management 
must provide all necessary assistance to facilitate resolution of the institution and the 
resolution objectives; 7) that all natural and legal persons are held liable, (in accordance 
with Member State law), and possible civil or criminal sanctions may be imposed on them 
 
35 BRRD, Art 32 (1) (a); Art 32 (4). 
36 BRRD, Art 5. 
37 BRRD, Art 32 (1) (b). 
38 BRRD, Art 32 (1) (c). 
39 BRRD, Art 32 (5) and SRMR, Art 18 (5). 
40 BRRD, Art 34 (1). 
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for their responsibility for the failure of the institution; and 8) that all covered deposits are 
fully protected.  
Pursuant to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 41 the threshold of 100.000 
EUR is an amount that should create a super-preference over the deposits that exceed 
this. It should be noted however that deposits are covered per depositor per bank. In 
practical terms the threshold includes the aggregated accounts that a given bank holds. 
Deposits held under different brand names of the same bank are not protected separately. 
This is not the case however where the same depositor has different deposits in multiple 
banks. 42 
2.2 Resolution tools and MREL 
Given that the conditions for resolution have been met, the resolution authorities 
shall not proceed to the utilization of any resolution tool unless they ensure that the capital 
instruments of the relevant institution performed their loss-absorbing function in full. This 
power to write down or convert capital instruments may be exercised either independently 
of resolution or in conjunction with a resolution action, where the conditions for resolution 
mentioned above apply. 43  It is worth noting however that although a write-down or 
conversion of capital instruments alone at the PONV might restore an institution to viability 
when the losses are sustainable and its business model sound, yet it is more common in 
practice to implement the aforementioned powers at the same time as resolution tools. 44 
Resolution authorities may then proceed with the adoption of a resolution scheme, 
which determines what resolution tool is to be applied to the firm that better suits the 
circumstances, having regard of course to the previously drawn resolution plan. The 
resolution tools are: a) the sale of business tool, (parts of the bank are sold to one or more 
private sector purchasers without the consent of shareholders); b) the bridge institution 
tool, (transfer of part of the business to a temporary structure under total or partial public 
ownership to preserve the bank's critical functions or to facilitate access to deposits; c) the 
asset separation tool, (separation of healthy and toxic assets between “good” and “bad” 
banks through a partial transfer of assets and liabilities to an Asset Management Vehicle 
 
41 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes [12.6.2014] OJ 
L 173. 
42 Ibid at n 33 (SRB, Resolution framework: Resolution Q&A), available at: <https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/resolution-qa>, accessed 9 
November 2018.  
43 BRRD, Art 59 (1). 
44 Ibid at n 2 (Kleftouri), para 8.33 p 171. 
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and/or d) the bail-in tool, 45(a mechanism to cancel or reduce liabilities of a failing bank to 
owners and unsecured creditors or to convert debt to equity as a means of restoring the 
bank's capital position to continue satisfying the conditions for authorization). 46 
As mentioned above the bail-in tool can be further divided into an open-bank bail-in 
and a closed-bank bail-in. In an open-bank resolution the authorities try to stabilize the 
bank as a going-concern by recapitalizing it through write-downs and conversions of 
liabilities to equity. Hence its critical functions remain protected without unnecessary 
disruption of the financial system and without recourse to public bail-outs. This process 
saves time for the authorities in order to reorganize the bank or wind-down parts of its 
business in an orderly manner. Furthermore, during this process its shareholders are 
severely diluted or wiped out; the previous management of the bank is replaced and its 
business plan reorganized. In a closed-bank resolution however, the entity is split in two; 
the bad bank and the good bank or bridge bank. The latter is a newly created institution 
which continues to operate while the former undergoes normal liquidation. The creditors 
that are not deemed systemic are left with the bad bank and incur losses in the context of 
liquidation, or are transferred to the new bank and their claims are written down or 
converted to equity. 47  Bail-in would apply a priori to any liability that is not explicitly 
excluded from it 48 and in exceptional circumstances where the resolution authority is given 
discretion to exclude certain liabilities from the scope of bail-in. 49  
For bail-in to be an effective and credible tool, the BRRD requires that all institutions 
established in the EU should meet at all times a minimum requirement for own funds and 
eligible liabilities (MREL) that could readily be exposed to loss in resolution. 50 This is 
expressed as a percentage of the institution's aggregate amount of own funds and eligible 
liabilities. MREL ensures the overall effectiveness of resolution by guaranteeing the loss 
absorption and recapitalization capacity of an institute in the event of resolution. The 
BRRD stipulates that the MREL should be tailored to bank-specific features by 
acknowledging its size, business model, funding model, risk profile and the adversities 
identified to implement the resolution strategy. MREL targets are set by the resolution 
authorities after consultation with prudential supervisors based on the criteria set out in the 
Directive and further specification by the EBA. 51 
 
45 BRRD, Art 37 (3). 
46 Ibid at n 26 (European Commission, EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD): Frequently asked questions). 
47 Ibid. 
48 BRRD, Art 44 (2). 
49 BRRD, Art 44 (3). 
50 BRRD, Art 45 (1). 
51 BRRD, Art 45 (6) & (2). 
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MREL seeks to achieve the same objectives as the TLAC (Total Loss-Absorbing 
Capacity), standard developed by the FSB to accommodate the ease of resolution 
regarding G-SIFIs at the international level, though it has been formulated rather differently 
in some respects. The implementation of the TLAC standard is still an ongoing process in 
the EU, yet the European Commission has published a set of legislative proposals in this 
regard as of November 2016. The MREL requirement on the other hand is a separate 
burden on the bank's balance sheet alongside its prudential minimum capital requirements; 
its calibration is closely connected to the prudential capital requirements as some of its 
features refer to them and capital instruments held by banks are also eligible for MREL. 52 
The MREL policy has not yet become binding for most banks under the SRB's remit 
in the EBU. Binding decisions on MREL have been issued by the SRB during the 2017 
resolution planning cycle 53 for the majority of the largest and most complex banks in the 
EBU at consolidated level, mostly being G-SIFIS and banks with resolution colleges in the 
Banking Union. For the rest of banks in the BU the SRB has only set non-binding 
informative MREL targets pending formal decisions, thus preparing them to comply with 
increasing requirements in the future. It is the SRB's aim to gradually proceed with setting 
binding MREL standards for all banking groups by 2020, as stressed in its Multi-Annual 
Work Proramme.54  
  
 
52Single Resolution Board, ‘List of public Q&As on MREL’, available at: 
 <https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/list_of_public_qas_on_mrel_-_clean.pdf, accessed 13 November 2018>. 
53Single Resolution Board, ‘SRB resolution planning 2017’ (30 November 2016), available at:  
<https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/20161128_slides_industry_dialogue_resolution_planning.pdf> accessed 13 November 2018, p 6. 
54 Single Resolution Board, ‘SRB Multi-Annual Planning and Work Programme 2018’, available at:  
<https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/srb_multi-annual_planning_and_work_programme_2018_final.pdf> accessed 13 November 2018, 
p 16.  
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3. Resolution framework vs State aid framework 
Recent developments have shown that the interaction and interconnectedness of 
mandatory burden sharing of the bank's internal stakeholders, (bail-in), in the context of 
resolution and the Commission's perception of State aid in favor of credit institutions can 
be problematic at times. With the advent of the resolution framework in 2014 the BRRD 
shifted the de facto powers to exercise and trigger resolution from the Commission to the 
designated resolution authorities. Yet 10 years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
interaction between the EU resolution framework and the EU state aid rules still remain a 
rather gray area that poses unanswered questions; namely, should governments be able 
to rescue failing banks in distress despite the new rules enacted to eliminate public bail-
outs, and if yes under what conditions? 55  
As mentioned above the BRRD is implemented in the Euro-zone via the Single 
Resolution Mechanism which comprises the SRB as the centralized resolution authority, 
and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), a fund used as a last resort to facilitate resolution 
once shareholders and creditors have first borne losses. The SRB owns and administers 
the SRF and shall grant access to it on the sole condition that it will be used to ensure the 
effective application of resolution tools and exercise of resolution powers. 56 The TFEU 
however in exceptional cases allows for aid granted by a member state to remedy a 
serious disturbance in its economy. 57 The main objective of the European Commission in 
its pursue to accommodate the principles of the internal market, is to maintain financial 
stability, whilst ensuring that the state aid granted is not capable of distorting competition 
between banks and across member states and that is kept to a minimum degree. Further, 
state aid is prohibited until a restructuring plan is presented and approved by the European 
Commission. National authorities shall prove to the Commission that all private sector 
 
55 Dr Andreas Wieland, Christoph Arhold, Kai Struckmann, Michael Immordino, Dr Luis Correia da Silva, Peter Hope, Nicole Robins, 
‘The new bank resolution scheme: The end of bail-out?’, (29 September 2016) White & Case/Insight, available at: 
<https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/new-bank-resolution-scheme-end-bail-out> accessed 15 November 2018, p 1. 
56 See at n 32 (SRM Reg), Art 67; Single Resolution Board, ‘List of public Q&As on MREL’ :“The SRF is composed for a transitional 
period of 8 years of national compartments until it becomes fully mutualised, (see SRM Reg. Art. 77), It is built up over time from ex-
ante contributions from the banking sector raised at the national level by NRAs. The SRF's target level by 31 December 2023 is to reach 
the threshold of 1% of the aggregate covered deposits of all credit institutions in the Banking Union. Since July 2016 a total amount of 
10.8 billion EUR was collected from nearly 4000 institutions in contributions. Its target size is dynamic and can be adjusted depending 
on the amount of covered deposits”, available at: < https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/resolution-qa> accessed 13 November 2018.  
57 Article 107 (3) TFEU. 
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measures have been exhausted and the situation has become critical so as to require the 
minimum possible state aid. 58  
The European resolution framework and the subsequent termination of bail-outs 
require that prior to any form of public recapitalization; a bank must be put into resolution 
provided that the prescribed conditions apply. Thus, a prior mandatory burden sharing is 
imposed to the shareholders and creditors of up to 8% of the institution's total liabilities 
through bail-in or otherwise, before resolution authorities can have access to public 
funding qualifying as state aid, i.e in the form of capital injections, government financial 
stabilization tools and the use of resolution funds or deposit guarantee funds. With respect 
to the insolvency hierarchy, equity and subordinated debt holders must be bailed-in first, 
followed by the senior creditors and the uninsured depositors at a later stage, provided 
that their claims are necessary to be written-down or converted to reach the 8% threshold. 
Only depositors that are protected by their respective national Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
(DGS) are automatically exempted from this requirement. 59 
The only exception whereby the injection of public funds may not trigger resolution is 
through the mechanism of pre-emptive recapitalizations set out in article 32 (4) (d) BRRD. 
This article permits extraordinary public financial support (EPFS) provided that the 
injection is precautionary, is granted after a failed stress test and specifically addresses 
capital shortfalls implied by an adverse scenario. Moreover the institution must be solvent 
in order to receive any public sector aid and not deemed to likely to fail in the future under 
the FOLTF test in the BRRD. Public sector support can be given, (except from capital 
injections) in the form of state guarantees to back central bank liquidity and in the form of 
other newly issued liabilities. Again this public involvement must comply with the EU state 
aid rules. 60 
The conditions applicable regarding the EU state aid granted to banks in distress are 
further specified in the 2013 Banking Communication from the Commission. 61  This 
framework contains detailed rules scrutinized and defined by the Commission as regards 
the provision of state aid to banks. Attention must be had however to the fact that the 2013 
Banking Communication was enacted prior to the Resolution framework of 2014 and thus 
is not fully in terms with it. This may possible create frictions especially with regard to the 
amount of burden sharing. An illustrative example of this reality can be the contribution of 
 
58 Ibid at n 2 (Kleftouri), para 8.60 p182. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid at n 55, (Wieland, Arhold, Struckmann et al) p 2. 
61 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1August 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favor of banks 
in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) [30.7.2013] OJ C 216.  
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senior debt holders to the restructuring costs of a bank. Both under the State aid and 
Resolution frameworks a mandatory burden sharing of the bank's internal stakeholders, 
(shareholders and creditors) is mandatory prior to any remedial aid provided by the 
sovereign. However unlike the BRRD, the 2013 Banking Communication does not require 
the senior debt holders to participate in the burden sharing. 62 This is of particular 
importance in circumstances where the option of bail-in is not adopted by the BRRD; such 
as in cases of preemptive recapitalizations, where the Banking Communication seems to 
be more lenient in its approach to burden sharing than that of the BRRD. 63 
Notwithstanding the significance of burden sharing preached by the Banking 
Communication, there is an exception to it; namely where under extraordinary 
circumstances burden sharing would be disproportionate or would create impediments and 
adverse effects to the preservation of financial stability. Thus, no measures would be 
implemented to that effect. This exception could be applicable where: “the aid amount to 
be received is small in comparison to the bank’s risk weighted assets and the capital 
shortfall has been reduced significantly in particular through capital raising measures”. 64 
These measures may include under para. 35: rights issues; a voluntary conversion of debt 
instruments into equity; a liability management exercise; capital generating sales of assets; 
portfolios or securitizations; earnings retention and other measures reducing capital needs. 
 It goes without saying that this reservation may prove to be beneficial for an 
institution and avoid a bail-in if at the same time resolution under the BRRD can be 
avoided. It is however the Commission's tendency to interpret this provision narrowly and 
allow this exception in exceptional cases. On the other hand not all public intervention in 
favor of a distressed bank necessarily constitutes state aid. This is particularly the case 
when state resources are utilized and governments decide to intervene in an institution in 
a manner that does not confer any specific advantages thereto or by means of an ordinary 
private investor.65 
3.1. Lessons learned from Greece and Italy 
The next section examines and presents live cases whereby national resolution 
authorities and the Commission adopted inconsistent and controversial decisions with 
regard to the provision of state aid to the respective ailing institutions of the member states 
 
62 Ibid at n 55 (Wieland, Arhold, Struckmann et al) p 2. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Banking Communication, para 45. 
65 Ibid at n 55, (Wieland, Arhold, Struckmann et al) p 2. 
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concerned. These examples reinforce the view held by many that the approach followed in 
each case may be subject to political expediency and not to public policy considerations. 
3.1.1. The Piraeus Bank case 
As discussed above with the enactment of the 2014 resolution regime the European 
legislator shifted the competence to trigger resolution and exercise resolution powers that 
were so far exercised by the Commission, to the banking and resolution authorities. Until 
then the Commission acted as the EU's de facto resolution authority imposing burden 
sharing, restructuring and resolution plans to troubled banks as precondition for the 
approval of state aid. The BRRD went one step further by introducing early intervention 
and burden sharing of the bank's stakeholders in all member states even against senior 
debt holders. Nonetheless the Commission in the Piraeus bank decision (SA.43364 
(2015/N), 66 provided its own interpretation regarding the conditions upon which a bank 
should enter resolution. The Commission in its decision not only used additional criteria to 
determine a resolution entry not foreseen by the BRRD, but also acted in violation of its 
role by exercising resolution powers now belonging to resolution authorities. 67 
Under Article 32 BRRD the resolution authorities are responsible to examine whether 
the conditions stipulated in this article are met and whether they are sufficient to trigger 
resolution. One of these criteria is the failing or likely to fail test (FLTF). The failing or likely 
to fail test is conducted by the resolution authority in consultation with the supervisory 
authority and is satisfied if either of the criteria set out in the article are met; one of them 
being the requirement of extraordinary public financial support, (EPFS), with the exception 
of the aforementioned preemptive recapitalizations. 68 In the Piraeus bank decision the 
Commission argued that if an institution is experiencing a capital shortfall evidenced by an 
asset quality review (AQR) base scenario stress test, it must be deemed FLTF and be put 
to resolution. This controversial decision raises three serious considerations: 69 
First, a stress test shortfall, even in an AQR/base scenario is not on itself capable to 
determine that an institution is failing or likely to fail. Because a resolution action (bail-in) 
has inherently significant and adverse effects on fundamental property rights, the BRRD 
provides an exhaustive set of criteria that constitute triggers for resolution. A stress test 
 
66 European Commission, ‘Amendment of the restructuring plan approved in 2014 and granting of new aid to Piraeus Bank’ State Aid 
SA.43364 (2015/N) – Greece  C(2015) 8626 final, [Brussels 29.11.2015] available at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261238/261238_1733314_89_2.pdf> accessed 20 November 2018. 
67 See infra at n 69 (Chamsaur) 40. 
68 BRRD, Art 32 (4) (d) i, ii, iii 
69 Amelie Champsaur, ‘Playing with Fire’ (2016) 35 Int'l Fin L Rev 40. 
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shortfall whether in AQR/base or adverse scenario form is not one them and neither is a 
failure to meet a capital increase deemed necessary by the banking supervisor following 
the results of a stress test. What is more, the determination of FLTF must be undertaken in 
the context of Article 36 BRRD; namely a “fair, realistic and independent” valuation of the 
institution's assets and liabilities must be carried out first. A stress test comprises a set of 
reviews of categories of portfolios and assets being analyzed based on sampling 
methodologies. These methodologies are constructed by the relevant EU authorities 
themselves implementing hypothetical stress scenarios and can hardly be considered “fair, 
realistic and independent”. Stress tests merely demonstrate the level of capital a given 
institution needs in order to be overcapitalized to the point where the supervisor deems 
that the institution is prudent, not the amount of recapitalization an institution needs to 
remain viable, ie when the bail-in tool is utilized. 70 
Secondly, the Commission in its decision proclaimed in essence the prohibition of 
preemptive recapitalizations. The Commission contended that preemptive recapitalizations 
can be used to cover shortfalls deriving from adverse scenarios and not from AQR/base 
scenarios. This position is not supported by the EU legislator since nowhere in Article 32 
and the EBA guidelines implementing it, is a distinction made between AQR, base and 
adverse shortfalls. On the contrary the only prerequisite is that the amount of capital 
injection shall not exceed the total shortfall. 71  Moreover the Commission held that 
preemptive recapitalizations cannot be used in AQR/base shortfalls because the latter 
entail and prove “loses incurred or likely to be incurred in the near future”. This position is 
ill-founded because an institution can have an AQR/base shortfall, meaning that it needs 
to raise capital in order to comply with the target capital ratios established in the stress test 
results without necessarily incurring or likely to incur losses. The 2014 Comprehensive 
assessment 72 for several Euro-zone institutions serves as an illustrative example to that 
respect. Contrariwise an institution can suffer losses despite being healthy and not having 
evidenced a stress test shortfall, ie due to a scenario of a massive fraud. At the end of the 
day as mentioned above, the FLTF condition must be assessed not on the basis of the 
losses evidenced in a stress test shortfall but according to an independent valuation 
 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 European Central Bank, 'Aggregate report on the Comprehensive Assessment' (October 2014), available at: 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/aggregatereportonthecomprehensiveassessment201410.en.pdf?68911b281b9d8
31540bb474c334437e7>, accessed 20 November 2018. 
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carried out pursuant to article 36 of the BRRD. Therefore there can be no presumption that 
stress test shortfalls imply actual or imminent losses. 73 
Thirdly, the Commission held that the lack of private sector participation to a 
contingent capital increase entails that the institution requires EPFS and therefore meets 
the FLTF test. It is however the case that an institution may sometimes require EPFS not 
because it is internally unhealthy or non-viable but because the external circumstances 
and the unstable economic environment discourage private investors' appetite, (see e.g 
BRRD Recital 41). 74 Especially now that bail-in is in force and it applies without any 
priority given to new funds, it is more than natural the private sector investors being 
discouraged particularly in periods of uncertainty and instability, regardless of the financial 
position of the relevant bank. Investors' reluctance can also be aggravated following 
sector-wide stress tests, which may reveal the need for recapitalizations of a significant 
portion of banks, thus reducing the urge of investors to recapitalize any individual bank. 75  
To sum up the question that arises is whether the Commission in the case above 
had any legal basis to even make the assessments as to the FLTF test. Nowhere in the 
BRRD or in the framework does the Commission enjoy competence to assess whether a 
bank meets the FLTF test or whether it should be placed into resolution. 76  As J 
Laitenberger 77 puts it: “It is for the respective supervisor or resolution authority, and not for 
the Commission, to apply this EU law and put a bank in resolution. The responsibility of 
the Commission is to ensure that State aid used in resolution does not unduly distort 
competition”. 78 The BRRD under article 32 provides only a limited set of circumstances 
that constitute triggers for resolution that must apply cumulatively and by no means is the 
provision of state aid an automatic trigger for resolution. The solution proposed for the 
Piraeus bank case by the Commission: e.g. to raise the threat of resolution if the private 
sector would not participate to a capital increase through capital injections or liability 
management exercises, in order to cover the entirety of the AQR/base shortfall and 
regardless of the institution's prudential situation, violates the BRRD and unduly and 
 
73 Ibid at n 69, (Champsaur) 40-41. 
74 Recital 41 of the BRRD: ‘Furthermore, the provision of extraordinary public financial support should not trigger resolution where, as 
a precautionary measure, a Member State takes an equity stake in an institution, including an institution which is publicly owned, which 
complies with its capital requirements. This may be the case, for example, where an institution is required to raise new capital due to the 
outcome of a scenario-based stress test or of the equivalent exercise conducted by macro-prudential authorities which includes a 
requirement that is set to maintain financial stability in the context of a systemic crisis, but the institution is unable to raise capital 
privately in markets’. 
75 Ibid at n 69, (Champsaur) 40, 41. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Johannes Laitenberger is the Director-General of DG Competition. He took office on 1 September 2015. Under the political guidance 
of Commissioner Vestager, he manages the Directorate-General within the framework set by its mission statement and work program. 
78 Johannes Laitenberger, ‘From bail-out to bail-in: laying foundations for a restructured banking sector in Europe’ (25 January 2016), 
Presentation in Lisbon: “Banking Union and Competition”, available at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2016_04_en.pdf> p 7. 
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disproportionately infringes fundamental property rights. Due to bail-in risk such capital 
increases in periods of financial instability create extreme dilutions of shareholders and 
subordinated debt holders and must be carried out with due process and the safeguards of 
property rights set forth in the BRRD. As a result EU institutions and the relevant resolution 
authorities are exposed to significant risk of legal challenge.79 
3.1.2. Veneto Banca, Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena (MPS). 
The course followed by the Italian government in order to tackle the problems of its 
ailing financial sector was the subject of a heated debate and questioning of the existing 
resolution regime. In April 2016 its government sponsored the creation of a private-backed 
bank rescue fund to address these issues. The roots of the problem stemmed from the 
high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) of up to 360 billion EUR that the Italian banks 
held in their balance sheets, which were an obstacle to economic recovery.  As a result 
Italy turned to its private sector for rescue and a 4.21 billion EUR back-stop fund was 
created, Atlante 1. 80 The fund was sponsored by Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 81 (a state-
owned institution), by banks, insurers and other institutional investors such as the Italian 
banking foundations. Its aim was to ease Italy's financial system by purchasing eligible 
NPL portfolios and also newly issued shares of banks not satisfying their SREP capital 
requirements. Atlante 1 was subsequently backed with a guarantee scheme by the Italian 
government so as to encourage a wide range of private investors. This type of government 
guarantee was not found by the Commission to have amounted to state aid, since it held 
that the state risk undertaken was limited and the state's remuneration was on ordinary 
market terms. Ultimately however the rescue plan was proved insufficient and the fund 
resources were drained in June 2016 when the fund acquired shares worth 2.5 billion EUR 
of two ailing Italian banks; Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza. Hence in August 
2016 a second private back-stop fund was created, Atlante 2, 82 in order to deal with the 
pressing issues of another institution; Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS). 83 
The controversial rescue plan of MPS through a precautionary recapitalization under 
a special insolvency procedure of the Italian law, unveiled some significant deficiencies of 
 
79 Ibid at n 69 (Champsaur) 40, 42. 
80 Ibid at n 55, (Wieland, Arhold, Struckmann et al.) p 2. 
81 See online at: <https://en.cdp.it/>, accessed 23 November 2018. 
82 Atlante 2 online at: <http://www.bankpedia.org/index.php/en/100-english/f/24297-fondo-atlante-2>, accessed 23 November 2018. 
83 Ibid at n. 55, (Wieland, Arhold, Struckmann et al.) pp 2, 3. 
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the bail-in rules. 84 The EBA's 2016 sector-wide stress test 85 indicated that MPS nursed in 
its balance sheet a high amount of NPLs which in turn contributed to a large reduction to 
its Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital.86 The Italian government provided a guarantee 
to MPS's privately funded recapitalization initiative and that action was deemed by many to 
entail a preferential treatment to its senior bondholders, though the state aid was labeled 
as contingent and might never be used.87 The Commission did not qualify the provision of 
the guarantee by the Italian government as state aid, since it held that the state acted in its 
commercial capacity by replacing an ordinary market participant. 88  
Thus the case of MPS serves as a prime example of a member state being 
resourceful and trying to avoid the unavoidable while it might be argued that it constitutes 
a breach of the state aid framework. It is however hard to contemplate the Commission's 
policy in this instance, as the rationale of the BRRD is to ensure that a bank is allowed to 
fail in an orderly and uniform manner by minimizing the use of state aid and without 
causing financial instability. To that end, A. Miglionico 89 notes: “The recourse to financial 
assistance increased the reliance on aid and undermined the BRRD rules. This means 
that precautionary recapitalization under the BRRD has deliberately been left as a 
loophole for cases where bail-ins cannot work”. 90 
The inevitable liquidation of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, following 
a decision by the SRB in 23 June 2017, though they were considered FOLTF, was justified 
by the fact that there was no public interest in resolving these banks and they'd better be 
liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings. 91 Albeit the absence of public interest the 
non-acquired part of institutions received liquidation aid as a pretext to mitigate economic 
disturbance and adverse effects on the market at the regional level; namely the aid was 
justified by the Italian government's own assessment of local effects of liquidation. 
However the authority to make such an assessment lies with the SRB. Therefore it can be 
argued as Andrea Enria denotes: “two different definitions of “public interest have been 
 
84 Commission, 'State aid: Commission authorises precautionary recapitalisation of Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena', (Brussels, 4 
July 2017), Press Release, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1905_en.htm>, accessed 23 November 2018, p. 2. 
85 European Banking Authority, ‘2016 EU-Wide Stress Test’ available at: 
< https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1519983/EBA_TR_IT_J4CP7MHCXR8DAQMKIL78.pdf>, accessed 23 November 2018, p 2;  
86 Andrea Miglionico, ‘Rescuing failing banks for financial stability: the unintended outcomes of bail-in rules’ (2018), I.C.C.L.R. 608, 
612. 
87 Bank of Italy, ‘The “precautionary recapitalization” of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena’, (2016), available at: 
<https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/approfondimenti/2016/ricapitalizzazione-mps/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1> 
accessed 23 November 2018. 
88 Gert Jan Koopman, ‘Market based solutions to bank restructuring and the role of State Aid Control: the case of NPLs’ (Brussels, 9 
November 2016), Speech delivered at the ECMI Annual Conference available at:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2016_09_en.pdf>, accessed 23 November 2018, pp.11–12. 
89 Andrea Miglionico, Lecturer in Banking and Finance Law, University of Reading School of Law. 
90 Ibid at n 86 (Miglionico) 608, 612-613. 
91 Single Resolution Board, “The SRB will not take resolution action in relation to Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca”, 
(Brussels 23 June 2017), Press Releases: available at: <https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/341>, accessed 27 November 2018. 
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applied, one at the EU level and another one by national authorities”, 92   which may 
compromise the consistent application of the EU resolution framework. Thus, the criteria to 
assess the public interest and consequently determine whether to follow the course of 
normal insolvency proceedings or resolution are still quite vague. Moreover EU regulators 
have wide discretion in assessing whether a bank is insolvent or FOLF, which leads to 
inconsistency of treatment of distressed financial institutions and political maneuvers from 
Member states to avoid bail-in and seek public support. 93 
3.1.3. The controversial quest for public interest 
Conversely, to further elaborate on the lack of inconsistency and divergent regulatory 
treatment of distressed banks there is the paradigm of Banco Popular. In this case the 
SRB concluded that the institution is FOLTF and that the adoption of a resolution scheme 
was in the public interest. 94 Banco Popular was resolved through the sale of business and 
bail-in tools mentioned above by transferring all its shares and capital instruments to 
Banco Santander SA with no involvement of state aid.95 
The fact that there is no clear-cut definition of public interest in the BRRD is 
evidenced through these illustrative examples of inconsistent treatment of institutions in 
distress. This raises serious concerns over the effectiveness of EU rules; notably as 
explained, wide powers are granted to supervisory authorities to evaluate the financial 
situation of failing institutions. At the same time there is an uncertainty spread among the 
bank's investors i.e shareholders and subordinated debt holders, as the triggers for 
haircuts are ill-defined.96 It is safe to infer thereafter as A. Miglionico notes: “that the bank 
insolvency regime remains subordinated to state aid”. 97 This approach enables member 
states to provide biased treatment and proclaim national champions, while simultaneously 
protect institutions whose failure could potentially trigger domestic political implications.  
 
92 Andrea Enria serves as the chairperson of the European Banking Authority (EBA) since 2011. On 7 November 2018 he was 
nominated by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank as the new Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board; Benoit Mesnard, 
Alienor Margerit, Marcel Magnus, ‘The orderly liquidation of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza’ (European Parliament, 25 
July 2017), available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602094/IPOL_BRI(2017)602094_EN.pdf> 
accessed 27 November 2018, p 8. 
93 Ibid at n 86 (Miglionico) 608, 613. 
94 Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1246 of 7 June 2017 endorsing the resolution scheme for Banco Popular Español SA C(2017) 4038: 
“The resolution of the Spanish bank can be regarded as private bail-in capital without intervention of the state”. 
95 Benoit Mesnard, Alienor Margerit and Marcel Magnus, ‘The resolution of Banco Popular’ (European Parliament, 28 August 2017), 
available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602093/IPOL_BRI(2017)602093_EN.pdf> Accessed 27 
November 2018, p 3. 
96  Robert Smith, 'Banco Popular serves as a harsh lesson for coco debt holders', Financial Times, 8 June 2018, available at: 
<https://www.ft.com/content/ec2d4b84-6a35-11e8-b6eb-4acfcfb08c11>, accessed 27 November 208. 
97 Ibid at n 86 (Miglionico) 608, 614. 
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In the MPS case there was a widespread market supply of subordinated bonds to 
retail investors with no transparency whatsoever in terms of the potential risks associated 
therewith. 98Hence, the Italian government introduced a compensating scheme for the 
affected retail investors whereby they were allowed to convert the subordinated debt 
securities into equity. 99 It can be argued however that this policy bypassed the principle of 
bail-in on subordinated debt holders that is applicable pursuant to the burden sharing 
principle when state aid is granted. 
As evidenced above the rules contained in the BRRD allow for wide discretion on the 
member states and competent resolution authorities to implement the necessary policy 
measures to protect the public interest. Nevertheless, the Directive does not provide a 
clear definition on the scope of public interest and public intervention. 100 In particular the 
BRRD does not provide a straightforward definition of the “interest to preserve financial 
stability and remedy a serious disturbance in the economy”; 101  As a result the 
interpretation of art. 32 (4) (d) of the BRRD concerning state aid is not clear and the 
suitability of the public measure to restore the equity of a distressed bank, (as with the 
precautionary recapitalization of MPS), is to say the least questionable. Moreover there is 
also no clear distinction between the concepts of precautionary recapitalizations and 
extraordinary public financial support. Article 32 of the BRRD considers these two terms 
homogeneous while in reality they should be regulated as different instruments. 102 It can 
be observed conclusively that the BRRD leaves ample discretion to competent authorities 
to construe the applicable regime in a way that is inconsistent with the public interest. 103 
 
 
 
 
98 European Commission, ‘Statement on an Agreement in principle between Commissioner Vestager and Italian authorities on Monte 
Dei Paschi di Siena (MPS)’, Press Release (1 June 2017), available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-
1502_en.htm>, accessed 30 November 2018. 
99 “MPS will compensate retail junior bondholders who were mis-sold by converting these bonds into equity and buying those shares 
from the retail investors. MPS will pay retail investors in more secure senior instruments”; See European Commission, ‘Statement on an 
Agreement in principle between Commissioner Vestager and Italian authorities on Monte Dei Paschi di Siena (MPS)’ (2017). 
100 Stefano Micossi, Ginevra Bruzzone and Miriam Cassella, ‘Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to promote a stronger EU financial system’, 
CEPS Special Report No.136 (April 2016), available at: <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20SR%20No%20136%20Bail-
in%20StateAid%20and%20Public%20Interest.pdf> accessed 30 November 2018, pp 16–17, 
101 Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Costanza Russo, ‘Precautionary recapitalization: time for a review’, (European Parliament, 11 July 
2017), Note provided in advance of the public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board in the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (ECON), p 10. 
102 Christos V Gortsos, ‘Last resort lending to solvent credit institutions in the euro area before and after the establishment of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)’ (Frankfurt, 1–2 September 2015) Paper presented at the ECB Legal Conference: ‘From Monetary Union 
to Banking Union, on the way to Capital Markets Union: new opportunities for European integration’, available at: < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2688953> Accessed 30 November 2018, p 6 
103 Ibid at n 86 (Miglionico) 608, 617. 
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4. Bail-in centered resolution in the EU 
In the previous chapter the main focus of the study was directed towards the 
inevitable friction between the EU resolution framework and the state aid framework, 
whereby the existing resolution regime contained certain loopholes and ambiguity that 
allowed for the relevant authorities and member states to circumvent the principles of bail-
in in terms of burden sharing, and resort to the public subsidy forms (bail-outs) of the past. 
This chapter will be more oriented to the challenges that the banking industry faces in 
applying the bail-in principle as a resolution tool per se and will highlight the deficiencies of 
the new framework in its effort to terminate the TBTF practice. In essence it will try to find 
the middle ground between the previously inconsistent approaches highlighted in the 
previous chapter and the difficulties in adhering to the new strict rules as prescribed by the 
new regime. 
4.1. Market Discipline 
The key ingredient of the new framework as mentioned above is the involvement of 
the bank's creditors in resolving failing banks (bail-in); it is the one that entails more 
technical and political complexity and the one that is likely to have a more profound impact 
on the institution's business model and corporate strategies. 104 It is clear that the EU held 
high hopes in the effectiveness of bail-in an approximation of which was followed in 
Cyprus in March 2013. 105 The strict prerequisites of the BRRD leave as an absolute last 
resort the injection of ESM funds borrowed by the member state to remedy its ailing 
financial sector. These regulations intend to tackle the moral hazard and alleviate the need 
for mutualization of liabilities for bank rescues in the Euro-zone. 106  Nevertheless as 
explained, the dogma of minimization of state aid is not an absolute one and it can be 
circumvented through the government stabilization tools subject to very strict conditions 
 
104 Fernando Restoy, ‘Bail-in in the new resolution framework: Is there an issue with the middle class?’ (Bank for International 
Settlements, Naples, Italy 23 March 2018), speech at the IADI-ERC International Conference: “Resolution and deposit guarantee 
schemes in Europe: incomplete processes and uncertain outcomes”, available at: <https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp180323.htm>, 
accessed 4 December 2018, p 2. 
105 European Stability Mechanism, ‘FAQ – Financial Assistance of Cyprus’, available at: 
<https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/faq-financialassistanceforcyprus.pdf>, accessed 4 December 2018; See also Avgouleas, 
Goodhart: “While the authorities would say that the Cypriot case was very different, given the absence of the resolution tools provided by 
the BRRD, we feel that its implementation gave important further momentum to the adoption of bail-in processes”. 
106 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 13. 
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prescribed in the BRRD, 107 and pursuant to the state aid rules that are approved by the 
Commission in accordance with Article 107 TFEU.  
One of the key desiderata of the new regime was to instill market discipline and shift 
the burden of dealing with a distressed institution by compelling mandatory private sector 
involvement (PSI). However desirable market discipline can be established if investors can 
predict the risk of their debt instruments being written-off or converted with reasonable 
certainty. Unfortunately the bail-in tool under the BRRD and the SRM-Reg provide for a 
highly complex framework where ample discretion is given in a multitude of authorities to 
dictate the triggers for PSI, and thus require significant inter-agency cooperation and 
information sharing. This can lead to the assumption held by many that the bail-in tool 
under the BRRD is likely to fail. 108 Market discipline makes certain that banks' funding is 
sensitive to the risks they have undertaken and can serve as a backstop to the excessive 
risk-taking and leverage of the past, where banks conducted business under implicit 
government guarantees. 109  However this structure requires a bail-in mechanism that 
allows for ex ante prediction of investment outcomes and a close monitoring of bail-in 
capital instruments that can be achieved only in the case of certain investors' portfolios 
with adequate risk-bearing/management capacities.110 
4.2. The “open bank” bail-in as an effective resolution strategy 
In the EU the utilization of an “open bank bail-in” aims at restoring to health an ailing 
institution while preserving its critical functions and maintaining it as a going-concern. It 
can also be used as a substitute to liquidation to resolve a banking group or parts of the 
group in conjunction with other resolution tools. There are four pivotal considerations that 
must be borne into mind when following a bail-in process: timing, market confidence, 
scope of restructuring and accurate calculation of losses. 111 
The resolution authority is faced with a difficult task in identifying the right timing in 
implementing the bail-in tool in a process that extends beyond the specially designed bail-
able debt. If the resolution authority triggers bail-in too early, it risks another round of bail-
ins being effected since the full scale of losses may not have been revealed yet. If it 
triggers it at a later stage and the full scale of losses is revealed, it risks a potential 
 
107 BRRD, Art (37) (10); Art (56); Art (58). 
108 Tobias H Tröger, ‘Too complex to work: A critical assessment of the bail-in Tool under the European Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Regime’, (6 February 2018), EBI Working Paper series 2017 - no 12, p 4. 
109 Tobias H Tröger, ‘Regulatory Influence on Market Conditions in the Banking Union: the Cases of Macro-Prudential Instruments and 
the Bail-in Tool’ (2015) 16 EBOR 575, 588 figure 3.   
110 Ibid at n 108 (Tröger) p 4. 
111 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 14. 
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creditors’ flight that do not possess eligible bail-able debt. Imposing large losses on private 
sector creditors might also bring forth legal concerns which could unduly delay resolution; 
Thus it can be argued that bail-outs might be less susceptible to legal suits than bail-ins.112 
A contagion effect might also ensue, causing a creditor flight from other banks and thus 
spreading fear throughout the financial system even if those banks are adequately 
capitalized with eligible bail-in-able debt. As Timothy Geithner notes there must be a 
strong backstop to keep other firms that are facing similar problems, from disseminating 
fears of additional failures and haircuts to their creditors. 113 
Moreover market confidence in the bailed-in firm must be reestablished quickly so as 
to retain its commercial integrity and repay the liquidity support that was granted to it by 
the central bank. 114 This is relevant in terms of how fast the capital position of the bank will 
be restored, (or in the case of a “closed-bank resolution” that of the new bank). The 
situation is substantially aggravated when the institution has entered into an irreversible 
state, with customers, creditors and depositors quickly disappearing.  
There should also be an accurate valuation of the losses incurred, including those 
that are not yet realized, in order to avoid an additional round of bail-ins to make up for the 
deficit. Experience during the financial crisis has shown that bank losses have been 
seriously underestimated. To avoid the aforementioned danger of underestimation the new 
accountants employed by the resolution authority will most likely apply a bad scenario, (or 
even a worst case scenario), method in calculating losses to be borne by the bailed-in 
creditors so as to avoid a further round of bail-ins. This generalized asset value free fall will 
most likely put to the test the existing valuation practices of other banks as the general 
public may start doubting the published accounting methods, thus causing a contagion 
effect. 115 
4.2.1 The affected players 
Generally speaking every bank is funded by three types of creditors: 
 Banking creditors, comprising retail and wholesale depositors that use the 
provision of payment, custody, and clearing services of the bank. 
 Investment business creditors, comprising swap counterparties, trading 
counterparties and others with similar claims from trading activities such as 
 
112 Ibid 3, 14 – 15. 
113 TF Geithner, ‘Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises’, (Random House 2014) 306. 
114 See n 1 (Sommer). 
115 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 15 – 16. 
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exchanges and clearing systems, and other investment business counterparties (ie. 
counterparties conducting repo activities).  
 Financial creditors, including almost exclusively long-term creditors of the bank 
such as bond holders and other long-term unsecured lenders of the bank.116 
Normally when a banking group is resolved only the third category of creditors 
should participate to the loss absorption and recapitalization needs of the bank since the 
banking creditors and investment business creditors hold claims against the unaffected 
operating subsidiaries. This is not the case however in the EU where resolution is being 
carried out at the legal entity level. Under BRRD investment business creditors may fall 
outside the scope of application of bail-in via pre-designed exemptions. 117 Thus it may be 
the case that the majority of the burden is shifted to the other two classes of creditors, 
namely the long-term investors and the uninsured depositors. 
Nonetheless, one seemingly valid point of a bail-in centered policy is that it better 
serves the interests of domestic taxpayers as opposed those of foreign investors; this 
argument however is to say the least quite weak and controversial. In particular the whole 
“rescue” plan of Cyprus was advocated by the need to protect the depositors of Cypriot 
banks at the expense of Russian investors. On the same footing foreign bondholders of 
Icelandic banks were in some sense penalized so as to protect domestic depositors. 118 
Yet those foreign investors will most probably not stay idle to such an eventuality and will 
either flee when they realize that they are being targeted, or demand a higher-risk 
premium. As a result the residual part of the bank's bondholders will eventually consist of 
other (non-bank) financial entities that are constituents of the same country. This would 
further contribute to the nationalization of the banking system. By having a purely 
domestically funded institution, the effect of transitioning from bail-out to bail-in will in 
essence have the effect of transferring the burden of loss from national taxpayers to 
another group of domestic payers, that of the pensioners and savers. It is therefore hard to 
contemplate why the latter have better capacity to absorb the losses and pay the penalty 
of a bank failure over the former. 119 Charities, small and medium-sized pension funds, or 
individual savers via pension funds, albeit the fact that they have willingly become 
creditors of the bank, lack the expertise to perform a monitoring function to the risks 
 
116 Clifford Chance, ‘Legal Aspects of Bank Bail-ins’ (May 2011) available at: 
<https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2011/05/legal_aspects_ofbankbail-ins.html>, accessed 5 December 2018 p 7; See also at n 3 
(Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 16. 
117 Ibid at n. 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 16.  
118 S Goodley, ‘Bondholders May Take Legal Action Against Iceland over Failed Banks’ The Guardian (7 November 2010) available at: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/nov/07/iceland-banks-bondholders-legal-action>, accessed 12 December 2018. 
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undertaken by the institution; Accordingly, this group of investors can hardly contribute to a 
bank's governance and would seem unfair to impose on them the penalty of a failure. On 
the contrary, it would be reasonable to infer that they were tricked into buying bail-in-able 
debt. 120  A viable solution would be for the resolution authorities to activate the 
discretionary safeguards of the BRRD 121  and exempt from the application of bail-in 
liabilities held by these vulnerable parts of savers' population that are at the same time 
stable sources of cheap funding and weak monitors of banks' business risks. These 
measures could alleviate any widespread contagion. 
4.2.2. Governance issues 
Bailed-in creditors, especially those whose stakes at the bank will be converted into 
new securities will be a rather fragile group of investors that are complex to handle, time-
consuming and prone to litigation. Faced with serious costs and lack of expertise the 
original creditors will most likely sell out their claims to those that specialize in such 
situations, the so-called vulture hedge funds. 122  As seen in the case of Co-op bank 
ownership may ultimately fall in the hands of this group of hedge funds. 123  Another 
example is that of Cyprus where bailed-in Russian depositors ended up having a large 
share of ownership in Cypriot banks. 124  
In theory bail-outs despite their well-known disadvantages provided governments the 
capacity to directly supervise who is to run the rescued bank. Despite the safety net 
existing that the new management shall be approved by the supervisory authorities, 
nonetheless the culture, pursuits and structure of a bank governed by these vulture funds 
will substantially differ from that of a bailed-out bank. The solution proposed by many, in 
placing caps on how much bail-in-able debt a creditor can hold would hardly alleviate the 
situation and probably entail a prohibition under EU law. Moreover it could restrict the 
liquidity of the market for bail-in-able debt and could impose a large burden on banks 
 
120 A Persaud, ‘Why Bail-In Securities Are Fool’s Gold’, (November 2014), Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 
14-23, available at :< https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb14-23.pdf> accessed 12 December 2018. 
121 BRRD, Art 44 (3) (c), (d). 
122  Katherine Burton and Katia Porcekanski, ‘Vulture Investing’ Bloomberg/Quicktake (31 May 2017), available at: 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/vulture-investing>, accessed 14 December 2018. 
123 As E Avgouleas and C Goodhart explain, “Co-op Group, which owned the Co-operative Bank outright, eventually bowed to the 
demands of a group of bondholders, including US hedge funds Aurelius Capital and Silver Point Capital, and agreed to a restructuring 
which left them with a 30 percent stake in the bank”; see also M Scuffham, 'Co-op to cede control of bank to bondholders', Reuters (21 
October 2013) available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/uk-coop-bank-bondholders-idUKBRE99K05O20131021>, 
accessed 14 December 2018. 
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having to hold insufficient amounts of bail-in-able debt, thus forcing them towards public 
bail-outs.125 
4.2.3. Legal considerations 
Notwithstanding that in all EU jurisdictions bail-in regimes have been given statutory 
force, it is doubtful that a series of litigation will be avoided once the bail-in process is 
activated. 126 In cases where bail-in frameworks extend beyond eligible bail-in-able debt, 
many courts will adjudicate that such regulations are directly abusing fundamental rights of 
property, which are embedded in the states' constitutions and international treaties. Legal 
suits will ensue by shareholders and creditors, invoking claims that their stakes have been 
unlawfully diminished and the value of their respective instruments of debt/ownership on 
the firm erased or seriously reduced. 127  The “no creditor worse-off” than liquidation 
principle stipulated in the BRRD 128 seems unlikely to prevent the anticipated stream of 
litigation. Contrariwise, it would intensify the latter. Where the result of administrative 
action is that bailed-in creditors receive a demonstrably lower return than they would have 
received had the bank proceeded into disorderly liquidation, the inevitable question is by 
whom they should be compensated 129 and in what form? 
Furthermore, a significant segment of the costs of resolution could be exhausted in 
settling conflicts of interest among creditors. 130 This is particularly the case where as 
mentioned above the ownership of the firm under resolution is concentrated among vulture 
hedge funds that specialize in lobbying and obtaining larger proceeds. This argument can 
be reasoned further by examining of who bears the costs of resolution in the case of bail-
outs and bail-ins respectively. In the first instance a rather small charge is imposed on the 
totality of taxpayers, whereas in the case of bail-ins a large portion of the costs is imposed 
on a small group of creditors with legal expertise and with the capacity to act in concert to 
pursue their claims, thus spiking the total costs of litigation. An illustrative example is that 
in the previously imposed publicly-funded bail-outs every taxpayer's tax liability increased 
a little, whereas in the case of bail-ins a small portion of creditors will incur great losses 
and as a consequence will have strong incentives to litigate.131  
 
125  Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 18. 
126 S Gleeson, ‘Legal Aspects of Bank Bail-Ins’, (2012), LSE Financial Markets Group Series Special Paper 205. 
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4.2.4 Funding implications 
During the past few years there have been a series of quantitative studies of the 
“subsidy” effect provided by governments in the form of tacit bail-out guarantees to SIFIs 
that were deemed too-big-too-fail. 132  The evidence indicates clearly that large and 
complex institutions are more eager to invest in riskier assets and accumulate higher risk-
profile portfolios than other banks. 133 This form of subsidy is mainly criticized for the fact 
that it distorts competition unfairly and undesirably at the expense of smaller competitors. 
By having access to lower funding costs, larger banks benefit from the net interest margin 
(NIM)134 and can provide lower interest rates therefore surpassing smaller competitors.135 
The new regime undoubtedly intended to restore the equilibrium between small and large 
banks; but shifting the intermediation away from larger banks towards smaller ones is in 
essence a way of shifting it from a safer, better regulated and more transparent place to a 
riskier less regulated and unexplored environment. 136 It can be argued additionally that 
this implicit subsidy benefits bank borrowers who can acquire loans at lower interest rates; 
it is because of their sheer size that these institutions operate at lower costs, thus allowing 
them to provide more attractive loan terms.137  
Undoubtedly so, the key desideratum of the bail-in centered regime was to instill 
market discipline, whereby creditors exposed to the risk of a bank failure would have 
stronger incentives to monitor and encourage the management of the bank to seek more 
prudent and cautious policies, as opposed to the more profit-seeking and risk-taking 
pursuits of the shareholders. Though noble the cause may be, and undoubtedly paving the 
way for a more prudent behavior, yet market discipline failed to establish itself years after 
the advent of the financial crisis, while investors in bail-in-able debt still face serious 
 
132 J Santos, ‘Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-To-Fail” Subsidy’ (March 2014) 20 Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Econ Pol Rev (Special Issue: Large and Complex Banks); K Ueda and B Weder Di Mauro, ‘Quantifying the Value of the Subsidy 
for Systemically Important Financial Institutions’ (2011), IMF Working Paper 12/128; Z Li, S Qu and J Zhang, ‘Quantifying the Value of 
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220. 
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adversities in assessing the stability of bank balance sheets. 138 Additionally, if a bank is 
failing and the bail-in tool is indeed implemented, it would probably amplify procyclicality 
effects. 139  The weaker the banks become after the ensuing restructuring and 
recapitalization, the harder and more expensive it would be for them to have access to 
new funding. Despite the fact that increased creditor monitoring fosters more prudent and 
cautious policies, in the event of a generalized recession, the financial and banking system 
in a given sovereign will seem weaker. In that regard the ECB has been skeptical about 
bailing-in bank bondholders.140  
Of course a counterargument might be that the previous vicious cycle of sovereign 
and bank indebtedness, which lead to the fiscal derailments of the past is in essence being 
eradicated; but should the costs of bank recapitalizations be too high, it would be doubtful 
if it is worth shifting the burden from the taxpayers to the pension funds, insurance 
companies, domestic investors and ultimately the remainder of banks. If the regulator is 
forced to choose the lesser of two evils, does that entail that people's pensions must be 
put at risk? It is highly debatable that should the crisis change form, it would be genuinely 
less severe and more contained than before. 141 
Another aspect of forcing banks to issue bail-in-able debt may not be at first glance 
the costs of such an endeavor but rather that of adverse selection. 142 To that end an 
excessive relaxation of the subordination requirement for MREL under the BRRD is a 
dangerous experiment. A smooth and unencumbered application of the bail-in tool to the 
rest of the financial system requires bail-in-able securities to be clearly identified by 
investors as such. The new regime ought to have stipulated that securities which could 
eventually be bailed-in should ideally be issued under clear contractual terms that 
establish explicit conversion triggers and fix their subordination to non-eligible liabilities. 143 
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forward’. Reuters, ‘Draghi asked EU to keep state aid rules for banks flexible’ (Milan, 19 October 2013) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/19/us-banks-bondholders-draghi-idUSBRE99I03B20131019>, accessed 16 December 2018. 
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The issuance of bail-in-able debt may also affect banks' choice of assets. Because 
banks are forced to issue a minimum amount of eligible/bail-in-able liabilities (MREL), as a 
percentage of total liabilities, (and own funds), rather than as percentage of risk-weighted 
assets, it will produce higher costs for institutions with a large portfolio of assets with a low 
risk-weighting (ie. mortgages). These institutions usually hold small amounts of capital in 
proportion to their total liabilities.144 
4.2.4.1 The middle class issue 
The resolution framework as envisaged in the BRRD is quite stringent; it heavily 
restricts the availability of public funds and the utilization of the SRF unless 8% of the 
institution's total liabilities have contributed to its loss absorption and recapitalization needs. 
Hence the institutions are obliged to hold on their balance sheets a minimum amount of 
liabilities and own funds subjected to bail-in in the event of resolution (MREL). This policy 
is quite novel even for the Key Attributes' standards. As a consequence much is left to the 
resolution authorities (and the SRB in the Banking Union) to determine the characteristics 
of MREL. 
Undoubtedly, the SRB has opted for a demanding approach. MREL requirements 
will be set at approximately twice the regulatory capital, 145 namely around 25-27% of risk-
weighted assets (RWAs) on average for institutions under the SRB's remit. 146  This 
exceeds even the standards set by the FSB for G-SIFIs and will be probably imposed to 
most if not all significant institutions in the BU and not only to those deemed globally 
systemic. Thus by conservative estimates, (see F. Restoy), the European banking industry 
will need to offset a shortfall of eligible liabilities that could exceed 117 billion EUR. 147 This 
data can be extracted by the SRB and corresponds to banks that held 80% of total assets 
of SRB banks. By other estimates, for instance that of the EBA, the total shortfall for 
significant EU banks could be between 130 billion EUR to 285 billion EUR depending on 
the final calibration of the MREL eligibility criteria. 148 
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These alarming findings can become particularly disturbing if we contemplate the 
business model of most medium-sized banks in the EU and Banking Union. The majority 
of significant institutions under the SRB's remit that follow a traditional business model 
whereby they lean on deposits and capital to acquire the necessary funding to conduct 
business, will face extreme hardship in making up for the huge shortfall, given of course 
that they have limited access to capital market financing. To that end by taking a peek on 
the relevant data and research, around 70% of significant banks under the SSM's direct 
supervision are not listed, 60% of them have never issued convertible instruments and 25% 
have not issued subordinated debt either. 149 
In that regard F. Restoy 150  gives an illustrative example; Notably if an ordinary 
medium-sized bank with a traditional business model and most of its funding deriving from 
equity and deposits, holds capital above the minimum regulatory threshold by say 25%, it 
will have to issue eligible and preferably subordinated instruments of up to at least 0.75 of 
its regulatory capital given that MREL is set at twice regulatory capital. Bearing in mind 
that the required reimbursement of newly issued subordinated debt is between half and 
two thirds of the return on equity of the firm, such MREL requirements will entail that a 
bank will have costs between 30 and 40% of its annual pre-tax profits. 151 
Thus it is more than clear that the extent of the shortfall and the potential impact of 
such strict requirements might have on a large part of the banking industry, will dictate the 
SRB's approach. In particular MREL requirements should always be imposed to make the 
specific resolution plans of the institutions feasible. An absence of a deadline and a long 
transitional period to meet the MREL requirements will not serve this purpose. An 
extensively long period for banks to meet the MREL requirements, (given that most of 
them are not yet compliant with the respective criteria), will impair the bail-in resolution 
strategies during this transition and will imply that institutions will have to subject uninsured 
deposits to bail-in in order to catch the 8% threshold and subsequently gain access to the 
SRF. This strategy would be dangerous and politically destabilizing. 152 
If bail-in conditions and the associated TLAC/MREL requirements solidify 
themselves as stringent as currently proposed, they could have a profound impact on 
banks' business models. Especially on those who lack the capacity to resort to capital 
markets and issue subordinated or convertible liabilities to meet the required amounts of 
 
149 Ibid at n 104 (Restoy), p 4; Data extracted from SNL Financial. 
150 Fernando Restoy, Chairman of the Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements. 
151 Ibid at n 104 (Restoy), p 4. 
152 Ibid at n 104 (Restoy), pp 4-5. 
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bail-in-able debt. Thus, it is quite possible that relevant elements of the resolution 
framework, which relies on the principle of bail-in, could be applied to those institutions 
that not only meet the public interest threshold for the use of resolution powers but whose 
size and business models allow them to draw large amounts of subordinated liabilities 
from the markets that could be bailed-in in resolution, without risking financial stability. For 
the remainder of institutions unable to meet their TLAC/MREL requirements, resolution 
authorities must satisfy themselves that their failure will not meet the public interest 
condition and endanger financial stability, since the alternative to resolution is regular 
insolvency proceedings. 153  
As a consequence the effectiveness of the resolution framework requires the division 
of the banking system into two well defined sections. The first one comprising large 
systemic banks able to resort to capital market financing, that could be subject to 
resolution including bail-in in case of failure, and the second one comprising non-systemic 
banks that could be subject to regular insolvency procedures. That leaves outside a 
portion of middle class institutions whose failure could be considered systemic but their 
business model disallows them from meeting the stringent MREL requirements. 154 
4.2.5. Liquidity issues 
Within an ongoing bail-in process it is quite possible that the ailing financial institution 
would only be able to conduct business along the lines of emergency liquidity assistance. 
Yet the amount of assistance in the form of lifeline liquidity from central banks, (ie. the 
ECB and resolution funds), could be seriously confined by the lack of high-quality collateral 
to back that assistance in the form of loans, and by the restrictions to seek the aid of 
taxpayers and impose losses on them. This process could be more intensive and 
cumbersome if a number of institutions have to be resolved at the same time. In the end 
liquidity support would be directed at safeguarding critical economic functions of the bank 
whilst other parts of the business are resolved. 155 
Central banks and resolution funds will probably be unwilling to bind themselves to 
pre-agreed liquidity assistance in all instances. Moreover, there is the issue of cross-
border liquidity assistance concerning international banking groups, whereby each central 
bank will only provide assistance in its own currency. 156 A robust resolution plan drawn in 
 
153 Ibid at n 104 (Restoy), p 5. 
154 Ibid at n 104 (Restoy), p 6. 
155 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 21. 
156 International Monetary Fund, Board Paper, ‘Cross-Border Bank Resolution: Recent Developments’, (2 June 2014), available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/060214.pdf>, accessed 26 December 2018, pp 15–17. 
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advance will be of essence and resolution authorities will need to satisfy themselves that 
another route is available without the provision of any liquidity; namely a plan that involves 
the immediate winding down of the failed entity via a series of rapid sales and transfers. 
Yet this strategy would undermine the core principle of the open bank bail-in regime, that 
is the continuation of the resolution entity and/or of its operating subsidiaries as going-
concern.157 
4.2.6 Creditors' flight and contagion effects 
One key factor of the effectiveness of taxation is that the taxed cannot easily evade it. 
The only way to evade taxation is by migrating, however that comes along with large 
transitional costs. On the contrary creditors when they sense that they are being targeted 
as a consequence of bail-in can simply withdraw or sell their claim. Therefore, when the 
bail-in mechanism is triggered and the need for large scale recapitalizations arises, it will 
likely cause a capital flight and a significant increase in funding costs. Creditors who sense 
in advance that they are being on the spotlight, and creditors of institutions that are 
constituents of the same country with a similar business model, will have reasonable 
incentives to withdraw deposits, sell debt, hedge their stakes or purchase credit protection 
at a higher premium, thus ultimately severely disrupting the markets. These actions might 
prove to be detrimental to a single institution158 and potentially have wider implications to 
market confidence, a point that is also underpinned by bail-in supporters. 159 Experience 
has shown that market tendencies to resort to panic during sector-wide stresses would 
most certainly produce contagious and destabilizing effects once a generalized bail-in 
mechanism is triggered. 
Given that the threshold of protection for guaranteed deposits is relatively law, a 
significant segment of uninsured large depositors might flee to other banking schemes that 
offer more attractive interest rates such as the contemporary Chinese shadow banks.160 
However it is true that equity holders and bondholders cannot flee in the same manner that 
depositors can, but financial counterparties can easily do and will swiftly do so if they 
 
157 Ibid at n 5 (KPMG) p 7. 
158 C Randell, ‘The Great British Banking Experiment –Will the Restructuring of UK Banking Shows Us How to Resolve G-SIFIS?’ 
(November 2011), (Paper prepared for the LSE Financial Markets Group Conference on ‘Banking Structure, Regulation and 
Competition’). 
159 S Micossi, G Bruzzone and M Casella, ‘Bail-in Provisions in State Aid and Resolution Procedures: Are they consistent with systemic 
stability?’ (21 May 2014), CEPS Policy Brief No 318, available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/20380155.pdf>, accessed 27 
December 2018, pp 8-9. 
160 Bloomberg, ‘A Guide to China’s $10 Trillion Shadow-Banking Maze’, (June 7 2018), Markets / Bloomberg News, available at: 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-07/a-guide-to-china-s-10-trillion-shadow-banking-maze-quicktake> accessed 26 
December 2018. 
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sense that the bailed-in bank does not possess a robust capital layer. 161 If these truly run 
the equity and bondholders will most certainly follow and by doing so they will drive many 
of the firm's assets rapidly down to a degree that it would be virtually impossible for the 
bank to acquire new funding, or roll over existing maturing bonds. Naturally, the situation 
that will be formed would be particularly unattractive. Credit extension in such 
circumstances would probably cease, leading to a further asset value free fall and 
exposure of other banks to the risk of insolvency. An initiative to exclude from the 
application of bail-in all depositors might reduce the danger of contagion but would not 
remove it completely.162 
 
161 Ibid at n 1 (Sommer). 
162 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 21 – 22. 
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5. Conclusions 
This study provided a comprehensive analysis of the bail-in centered regime in terms 
of the legal, socioeconomic and political challenges that surround its implementation and 
overall effectiveness. It is by no means the purpose of this overview to demonize this new 
shift of perspective in dealing with banks in financial distress, but rather to raise awareness 
with respect to the implications it might have on a wide array of sectors. Undoubtedly so, 
(quoting the words of a leading practitioner): “Bail-in under the BRRD is complicated”. 163 
This statement stems from the fact that it derives from a highly complex bank resolution 
legal framework. It grants resolution and supervisory authorities ample discretion to decide 
upon sensitive matters that could have divergent outcomes and could often produce 
controversial or non-consistent decisions. The cases presented, (supra in 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 
3.1.3), serve as typical examples in that respect. These cases manifestly indicate that the 
European resolution framework offers many routes for the authorities to stabilize ailing 
institutions; As a result, mandatory burden sharing of the banks' creditors and the degree 
thereof in the form of a private penalty for their failure, can be somewhat subjugated to 
political bullying. Ultimately, bail-in centered resolution under the BRRD can produce 
satisfactory outcomes ex post yet it is uncertain whether it can reinstate market discipline; 
namely risk-reflect pricing of bank capital ex ante. 164 
Perhaps a more radical solution proposed by some scholars is needed. That is the 
disentanglement of bail-in and the subsequent creditors' participation from the broader 
resolution process and the dependence of the former on the uncertain resolution outcomes. 
To that end bail-in should be confined solely as a tool for the recapitalization of a 
distressed bank essentially detached from the imminent restructuring of its business 
structure, (i.e. with the utilization potentially of the sale of business or asset management 
tool), which inherently requires case by case analysis and wide discretion. 165  
The highly discretionary trigger event should be replaced with a clearer trigger event 
by restricting the private involvement to specially designated capital instruments, thus pre-
determining the scope of bail-in. These alternative instruments may include a sufficiently 
 
163 Simon Gleeson, ‘The Architecture of the BRRD – A UK Perspective’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds.) European Banking 
Union (OUP 2015) para 12.36. 
164 Ibid at n 108 (Troeger), p 33. 
165 Thomas F Huertas, ‘Safe to Fail: How Resolution will Revolutionize Banking’, (Pal-grave Macmillan 2014), in safe to fail chapter: 
(distinguishing between the determination of the resolution trigger, the stabilization over the proverbial weekend, and the restructuring 
with the sale of assets, discontinuation of business lines etc.)82, 89; Ibid at n 108 (Troeger) p 33. 
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high amount of contingent convertible instruments (CoCo-bonds) 166 on a bank's capital 
layer. One key feature of CoCo-bonds and other convertible instruments is that they can 
be utilized at an earlier stage independently of the initiation of resolution 167  and thus 
incrementally contribute to a bank's recapitalization, if need be. Therefore, desirable 
market discipline can be achieved by enhancing predictability of creditors' contribution in 
going-concern scenarios and equipping them with more certainty. 168 
The regulation of TLAC and MREL provide some certainty in that regard, (in terms of 
high quality financial instruments subjected to bail-in), yet the stringent requirements as 
envisaged by the authorities should severely restrict from the majority of European Banks 
in the future the option of raising necessary funding to retain authorization. Most European 
universal banks today lack profitability and fall in the category of medium-sized institutions, 
which are further squeezed by international competition from large systemic institutions 
with continuous access to capital market financing. In order to preserve the no-bail-out 
principle, many of these institutions unable to meet the strict requirements, will be put to 
ordinary insolvency proceedings and liquidation, albeit considered systemic. This may lead 
to the disruption of their critical economic functions, the very notion that the resolution 
regime sought to protect under the public interest threshold. Thus, a special insolvency 
regime applicable to this segment of middle class institutions might be the safest route. 
This new regime should acknowledge the peculiarities of the financial sector, and in 
contrast to the ordinary insolvency procedure which aims at maximizing profit to satisfy 
creditors, will mitigate the adverse impact of banks' failure and will not lead to unnecessary 
destruction of value. 169 
In the EU there is a need to develop a harmonized special insolvency regime for 
financial institutions given the divergence of insolvency rules applied at the domestic level 
and the incapacity of many institutions to adapt to a common resolution framework 
operated by a single European authority. In that respect it is worth noting the recent 
 
166 Darell Duffie, ‘A Contractual Approach to Restructuring Financial Institutions’ in George P Schultz, Ken E Scott, and John B.Taylor 
(eds), Ending Government Bailouts as We Know Them (Hoover Institution Press, 2010), p 109, pp 109-110; Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al, 
‘Contigent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features’ (2011) IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/11/01, 7-8, available at: 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf>, accessed 5 January 2019; Mark J Flannery, ‘No Pain, No Gain? Effecting 
Market Disci-pline via ‘Reverse Convertible Debentures’’ in: Hal S Scott (ed), Capital Adequacy Beyond Basel: Banking: Securities, and 
Insurance (OUP 2005), p 171, 173, pp 175-182. 
167  Enrico Perotti and Mark Flannery, ‘CoCo bonds as a way of preventing risk’, (2011) VOXEU policy contribution 
<http://voxeu.org/article/coco-bonds-way-preventing-risk>, accessed 5 January 2019.   
168 Ibid at n 108 (Troeger) p 9. 
169 Ibid at n 104 (Restoy) p 6. 
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proposal of the US Treasury to develop a new Chapter 14 of the US bankruptcy Code 170 
for financial institutions that meet specific criteria. 
Everyone acknowledges that bail-ins are far superior to bail-outs in the case of 
idiosyncratic failures, however in the event of a sector-wide shock the bail-in tool may 
prove itself insufficient. Hence, a credible government backstop171 should be in place to 
ease any rational and irrational fears of investors in bail-in-able debt that could otherwise 
flee at a moment's notice. This is also of particular importance as regards deposits in Euro-
zone member states, where depositors in the same currency may migrate from member 
states with weaker sovereigns to more solvent ones.172 Other critical issues may concern 
the rapid restoration of market confidence in the failed firm, the accurate valuation of its 
losses and the successful restructuring of its franchise profile to develop a sound business 
model. 
 
170  US Department of the Treasury, 'Orderly liquidation authority and bankruptcy reform', (21 February 2018), available at: 
<https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/OLA_REPORT.pdf>, accessed 5 January 2019. 
171 Ibid at n 3 (Avgouleas, Goodhart) 3, 29. 
172 D Schoenmaker, ‘A Fiscal Backstop to the Banking System’ (July 2014), Duisenberg Business School, DSF Policy 
Paper No 44. 
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CET1   Common Equity Tier 1 
CoCos   Contingent Convertibles 
DFA   Dodd-Frank Act 
DGS   Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
EBA   European Banking Authority 
EBU   European Banking Union 
ECB   European Central Bank 
EPFS   Extraordinary Public Financial Support 
ESM   European Stability Mechanism 
EU   European Union 
FMIs   Financial Market Infrastructures 
FOLTF   Failing or Likely to Fail 
FSB   Financial Stability Board 
G-SIBs   Global Systemically Important Banks 
G-SIFIs   Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
MPS   Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
MREL   Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities 
NCWO   No Creditor Worse Off 
NIM   Net Interest Margin 
NPEs   Non-Performing Exposures 
NPLs   Non-Performing Loans 
NRAs   National Resolution Authorities 
OLA   Orderly Liquidation Authority 
PONV   Point of Non-Viability 
PSI   Private Sector Involvement 
RWAs   Risk-Weighted Assets 
SRB   Single Resolution Board 
SREP   Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
SRF   Single Resolution Fund 
SRM   Single Resolution Mechanism 
SSM   Single Supervisory Mechanism 
TBTF   Too Big To Fail 
TFEU   Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union 
TLAC   Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity 
   
